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Abstract 
The VoIP system is build on the IP network, so it is affected by the IP network security problem. It has many security 
problems because of the security mechanism of VoIP system and other external factors. These effects relate to the following 
three aspects: confidentiality, integrity and availability. This paper makes a detailed analysis discussed several security 
potential threats by dividing it into several categories like social, eavesdropping, service abuse, etc. and finally shows how 
this threats are harmful to VoIP.  
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I. INTRODUCTION OF VOIP 
 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a technology that allows users to make telephone calls using a broadband 
Internet connection instead of an analog phone line. VoIP holds great promise for lowering the cost of 
telecommunications and increasing the flexibility for both businesses and individuals. VoIP leverages existing 
IP-based packet-switched networks to replace the circuit-switched networks used for voice communications 
since the invention of the telephone [1]. The VoIP infrastructure consists of endpoints (telephones), control 
nodes, gateway nodes, and the IP-based network. The IP network can utilize various media including Ethernet, 
fiber, and wireless. The VoIP system interacts with both local and remote VoIP phones using the intranet and 
Internet as well as interacting with phones connected to the public-switched tele- phone network (PSTN) through 
gateways. As VoIP resides on the IP network, the vulnerabilities in VoIP encompass not only the flaws inherent 
within the VoIP application itself, but also in the underlying operating systems, applications, and protocols that 
VoIP depends on [5]. The unauthorized access, worms, viruses, Man-in-the-Middle, denial of service attacks 
which are not previously issues with the circuit-switched network are now easily implemented in VoIP. 
II. VOIP THREAT CLASSIFICATION 
 
To classify the surveyed work, we use the taxonomy provided by the Voice over IP Security Alliance 
(VoIPSA)3. VoIPSA is a vendor-neutral, not for profit organization composed of VoIP and security vendors, 
organizations and individuals with an interest in securing VoIP protocols, products and installations. The 
VoIPSA security threat taxonomy [7] aims to define the security threats against VoIP deployments, services, and 
end users. The key elements of this taxonomy are [1]: 
1. Social Threats 
2. Eavesdropping 
3. Interception and Modification 
4. Service Abuse 
5. Intentional Interruption of Service 
6. Other Interruptions of Service 
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A. Social Threats 
Social threats focuses on how to manipulate the social context between communication parties so that an attacker 
can misrepresent himself as a trusted entity and convey false information to the target user [2]. This definition 
describes threats categorized under misrepresentation but theft of service and unwanted contact are also 
categorized as social threats. These threats can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Social Threat 
Misrepresentation: 
Misrepresentation is an assertion or manifestation by words or conduct that is not in accord with the facts. As 
can be seen in Figure 2 the attacker claims to be User A by presenting false information to User B (the victim) 
[3]. This is done e.g. in order to gain access to otherwise unreachable information, gain access to toll calls, call 
logs, files and for phishing purposes. The attacker may misrepresent his identity, authority, rights and/or content 
in order to fulfill his achievements. 
 
Figure 2. Misinterpretation 
Theft of Service: 
Theft of service stands for any use of service without proper payment. Toll frauds have been a part of the 
telephone system almost from start and VoIP is no different [4]. Typical theft of service is placing calls without 
payment. This may be done by hacking the system or changing billing information. More serious attack is the 
unlawful taking of service provider property. Over the years many cases have come up where computer 
criminals hack a service provider and sell his phone minutes on the black market. Attacks on private 
telecommunication stations are also increasing in number and magnitude. The number of minutes sold can be in 
thousands or even millions so the financial loss for the victim can be significant. 
Unwanted Contact: 
Unwanted contact is any contact that either requires prior affirmative consent for incoming calls or bypasses a 
refusal of consent for outgoing calls (VoIPSA, 2005). Harassment, extortion and unwanted lawful content fall 
Control Theory and Informatics                                                                                                                                                         www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5774 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0492 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.5, 2013  
 
32 
under this category. The biggest issue, of those three, for service providers and users is the unwanted lawful 
content. Unwanted lawful content may include lawful pornography, advertisements and/or other unwanted 
messages. In many cases the attacker sends out a bulk of session initiation attempts to the user in order to spam 
messages to him as can be seen in Figure 3. Everybody is familiar with the annoying e-mail spams that count for 
up to 95% of all email traffic (Trend, 2010, p. 27). They have been countered with filters, which are capable of 
blocking about 90% of all spams, and the awareness of users. With VoIP came the possibility of spam over IP 
telephony or SPIT [4]. SPIT is somewhat comparable to PSTN-call spam in the form of telemarketer calls. The 
main difference is that through VoIP those sorts of calls are made much easier due to lower call cost, spam 
applications and so on. Attackers can even infect other users with viruses and utilise their bandwidth to generate 
spam. 
 
Figure 3. SPIT Attack 
SPIT is getting more popular due to the fact that it’s much harder to counter than e-mail spam. Since voice is 
real-time media users can’t recognize spam until they have listened to its content. 
B. Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is when an attacker intercepts a data stream between two or more users without altering the data 
[4]. The attacker does however gain access to the conversation between the users, as can be seen in Figure 4, 
making users vulnerable to the threats shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4. Evasdropping attack 
 
Figure 5. Evasdropping attack threats 
Call Pattern Tracking 
Call pattern tracking is the unauthorized tracking of users’ call pattern. This enables the attacker to capture and 
analyze victims’ phone records and use it to his advantage. This means the attacker can see who the victim has 
been calling which can be helpful in many situations. Reasons for these attacks may include theft, extortion and 
espionage [4]. Traffic Capture In traffic capture, the attacker can capture ingoing/outgoing traffic and eavesdrop 
it. He however can’t alter the traffic in any way. Number Harvesting Number harvesting is the unauthorised 
collection of IDs, usually in the form of phone numbers. The attacker monitors incoming/outgoing calls in order 
Control Theory and Informatics                                                                                                                                                         www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5774 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0492 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.5, 2013  
 
33 
to build a database of legitimate IDs. The databases can be used for other attacks such as SPIT, toll fraud calls 
and DoS attacks (Endler & Collier, 2006, p. 149). 
 
Reconstruction 
Reconstruction refers to any unauthorized monitoring, recording, storage, reconstruction, recognition, 
interpretation, translation and/or feature extraction of any portion of a media session without consent of the 
owner (VoIPSA, 2005). 
C. Interception and Modification 
Threats in this category describe attacks where the attacker can intercept and modify the traffic between two or 
more endpoints [6]. In Figure 6 a scenario is depicted where the attacker has intercepted traffic between two 
endpoints. The attacker now has the power to implement the threats shown in Figure 7. These attacks are also 
known as MitM attacks. 
 
 
Figure 6. Interception and modification 
 
 
Figure 7. Interception and modification threat 
Call Black Holing 
Call black holing stands for any unauthorized method of redirecting essential elements of any VoIP protocol, 
usually SIP or H.323. This results in delayed call setups, errors in applications, dropped calls and other denial of 
service [6]. One example of a black holing attack is when an attacker denies all incoming calls to a specific 
organization such as hospitals, banks or police stations. 
Call Rerouting 
In call rerouting the attacker changes the call direction from one or more endpoints by altering the routing 
information in the protocol message [12]. Reasons for rerouting are to either include illegitimate notes into a 
communication or exclude legitimate ones. Attacker can use this attack for scams. One example is when an 
attacker reroutes incoming calls, e.g. to a bank, to himself and attempts to gain critical information from the user 
in the process, e.g. PIN numbers [6]. 
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Alteration 
Alteration, as the name applies, refers to any unauthorized alteration of communication. The attacker will alter 
some or all of the communication between endpoints in order to e.g. misrepresent identity, or deliver undesired 
information. These attacks can be extremely dangerous for the users as, in many cases, they think they are 
talking to a trusted person and may give up critical information to the attacker. 
Conversation Degrading 
Conversation degrading stands for any unauthorized reduction in QoS of any communication. The attacker 
intercepts and manipulates the media packets in a communication in order to introduce latency, jitter and so on. 
Reasons for these attacks may be to frustrate users or undermine SP’s reputation. 
Conversation Impersonation and Hijacking 
Conversation impersonation and hijacking includes any modification of a communication in order to 
impersonate a trusted user or hijack the traffic completely.  
False Caller Identification  
False caller identification is a threat where the attacker calls a user and manages to signal untrue identity [4]. 
One example is where an attacker represents a bank employee, or other trusted person, and asks for a PIN 
number or any other critical information. The victim may be more likely to give out this information if he sees 
the banks phone number calling him. 
D. Service Abuse 
Service abuse covers threats regarding any kind of fraudulent activity regarding VoIP. List of threats can be seen 
in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Service Abuse Threat 
Premium Rate Service Fraud 
Premium rate service fraud is the act of deceiving someone to call a premium rate number without offering some 
reward or service for the process [8]. Premium rate numbers bear higher calling cost as portion of the fee goes to 
the owner of the number. Fraudsters have manyways of enticing users to call these numbers and one popular way 
is by false advertisement. Improper Bypass or Adjustment to Billing This threat describes any unlawful method 
to avoid service charges or bills.  
 
E. Intentional Interruption of Service 
Threats in this category all aim at interrupting users from using VoIP and/or other service as depicted in Figure 
9. In most cases the attacker has no personal gain from these attacks so the biggest motivation for attacks in this 
category is to annoy the victim. Intentional interruption can be carried out in many ways. DoS threats, especially 
VoIP specific ones, count for the largest part of intentional interruption threats. 
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Figure 9. Interruption of service Threat 
 
 
Figure 10. Interruption of service categories 
Denial of Service 
Denial of service or DoS attacks are well known in the computer world as hackers, through the years, have 
applied various ways to deny users of some sort of service. DoS attacks are defined as attempts to make 
computer resources unavailable to their intended users and this is precisely what they do [4]. The hacker, through 
various measures, floods the system and makes it unable to function correctly in the process. Since VoIP is IP 
based it is also vulnerable to DoS threats. There are number of ways that an attacker can deny VoIP service but 
the threats can be divided into four categories. These categories will now be studied further. 
Distributed DoS 
DDoS is an attack where number, often thousands or even millions, of computers are utilized to attack a single 
target. Usually the attacker utilizes a number of computers without their owner consents to form a so-called 
botnet. These bonnets are then controlled by one master computer and their forces combined to attack a single 
target, flooding it with countless number of packets. 
 
Underlying operating system or firmware DoS 
Most of the underlying OS and firmware for VoIP is run on popular operating systems or firmware that regularly 
becomes vulnerable to new threats, e.g. viruses. Vendors update their products regularly but hackers are quick to 
find and exploit any sort of vulnerability in the underlying systems. 
Network services DoS 
Network service DoS describes the threat that an attacker targets network components or services that the VoIP 
service depends on. For example the attacker can flood routers, switches, proxies, etc [10]. making them unable 
to function properly and therefore close down any VoIP service passing through these network components. The 
attacker can also target services that VoIP depends on like DNS and DHCP with the same results. 
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VoIP specific DoS 
Threats in this category are all VoIP specific i.e. they all utilize vulnerabilities in VoIP protocols, endpoint 
software, setup etc. to enable attacks. Physical Intrusion Physical intrusion describes the threat that an 
unauthorized person gains access to a protected premise [10]. If that premise is accessed the attacker can cause 
serious damage to a VoIP system by various methods. The premise can be in the form of a tangible asset such as 
a building or a facility. It can also be in the form of an intangible asset such as the physical layer of the OSI 
model. 
F. Other Interruptions of Service 
This category hosts other threats that interrupt VoIP service but aren’t necessarily intentional. The threats can be 
seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Other Interruption 
Loss of Power 
Since VoIP is data network based, power loss will deny users of any service unless they have some backup 
power in place. Power loss can have various causes, both intentional and unintentional. Intentional causes 
include vandalism, theft, terrorism etc. often in the form of direct physical damage to power stations or other 
power sources. Regular power outage will deny endpoint devices of service since they rely on external power 
sources and are seldom UPS-protected. 
 
Resource Exhaustion 
Resource exhaustion is a simple denial of service condition which occurs when the resources necessary to 
perform an action are entirely consumed, therefore preventing that action from taking place. (OWASP, 2009). 
Resource exhaustion can origin from various causes. Attackers can flood a victim’s system with various 
requests, depleting all CPU memory in the process. Faults in software/hardware and viruses may also cause 
resource exhaustion in various ways [7]. 
Performance Latency 
Latency, or delay, is measured as the time it takes a packet to travel from its origin to its final destination. The 
delay can be divided into three categories: Propagation delay, handling delay and serialization delay [4]. 
Propagation delay is caused by the length that a signal has to travel in packet networks. Handling delay describes 
the delay caused by devices that  forward the packet through a network (e.g. packetization, compression, and 
packet switching). Finally serialization delay is the time it takes to place a bit/byte onto an interface (Davidson, 
Peters, Bhatia, Kalidindi, & Mukherjee, 2006).  
III. Conclusion 
Because VoIP is on the application of the Internet, It has the inevitable problem of Internet security. With the 
VoIP system, the popularity of it brings more prominent security issues. This paper introduces  VoIP system 
which may be subjected to attacks. VoIP systems can build a security system as a supplementary means of 
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enhancing the security of VoIP in order to achieve the traditional telephone the safety of the system level. In the 
practical applications, VoIP security, which involves many aspects of protocol, network equipment, code 
writing, operating system security, user security awareness, and many other aspects, is a comprehensive project. 
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